Using an efficiency-based framework, this paper analyses the performance of New Zealand's telecommunications sector under competition law-based sector governance (the period from The analysis reveals that substantial gains in all forms of efficiency were achieved during the 1990s, both compared to historic New Zealand and contemporary OECD benchmarks. Under industry-specific regulation, however, transfers to consumers appear to have reduced, transaction costs have increased and delays are being incurred in the deployment of new applications and technologies relative to the competition law regime as participants engage in strategic gaming with politicians and the regulator and respond predictably to the range of incentives offered under the regulatory regime. The paper concludes that on balance in the New Zealand circumstances, the regime based predominantly upon competition law appears to have outperformed the industry-specific regulatory regime, albeit due in large part to sector participant interaction shaped by contractual obligations imposed by the government on the incumbent which have prevailed unchanged under both regimes.
Introduction
New Zealand was the first country in the OECD to adopt a 'light-handed' approach to telecommunications regulation when, in 1987, it eschewed industry-specific regulation, "relying instead on the potential for entry to discipline behaviour within the context of a business environment for which the competitive practices of all firms are subject to a single Commerce Act" (Boles de Boer & Evans, 1996:24) . The Telecommunications Act 1987 marked the end of combined state sector ownership and political control of the telecommunications sector that had characterised the New Zealand industry's first hundred years (Wilson, 1994) . The reforms resulted in the removal of all regulatory restrictions on the supply of telecommunications equipment from mid 1988, the creation of a stand-alone telecommunications State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) on 1 April 1989, and the simultaneous removal of all statutory monopoly provisions protecting the state-owned enterprise from competition in any of its service provision 0activities (Howell, 2007) .
The 'light-handed' regulatory environment established under the Commerce Act 1986 and the Telecommunications Act 1987 prevailed throughout the 1990s, during the privatisation of the incumbent provider (Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited, hereafter Telecom) in 1990, the entry of competitive fixed-line infrastructure and services suppliers from 1991, the establishment and growth of mobile market competition from 1994, the expansion of the commercial internet from 1996 and the consequent emergence of the 'information economy' (Howell & Obren, 2003) .
Contemporaneously, New Zealand emerged as one of the earliest-adopting and highestutilising OECD countries in respect of most of the demand-side indicators typically used to assess improved economic performance arising from the Internet, such as the number of individuals connected, the number of hours spent online, the number of secure servers per capita, the number of transactions per secure server and the number and use of autonomous and routed IP addresses per capita (Howell & Marriott, 2004; Howell, 2006; .
Nonetheless, the country's broadband uptake has been low by OECD standards (Howell, 2003; . 
Developing a Performance Measurement Framework
Consistent with any performance assessment exercise, performance measures and benchmarks must be defined. From an economist's perspective, the appropriate measure to use is economic efficiency (total welfare) -the sum of consumer and producer surplus (Carlton & Perloff, 2005:682) . The solitary justification for either the enactment and enforcement of competition law or the application of industry-specific regulation is that it leads to increases in efficiency. If total welfare increases (decreases) as a consequence of an intervention/regime relative to a base starting point or counterfactual, then the intervention/regime can be adjudged as more successful (less successful), relative to the benchmark against which the comparison was made.
Market Share Does Not Accurately Measure Welfare Gains
Competition law and its associated jurisprudence are based upon the premise that pursuit of competition is justified when such pursuit leads to increased efficiency -that is, efficiency is the 'end' objective and competition is just one of a number of means towards that end. When pursuit of competition is contraindicative to the pursuit of efficiency (for example, in some high fixed or sunk cost industries where too much competition may result in inefficiently low levels of investment), then if competition law is sufficiently inflexible or unable to give due weight to efficiency-related issues, industry-specific regulation may be able to deliver more efficient outcomes (Carlton and Picker, 2007; Howell, 2008a) .
It is therefore insufficient to adjudge the performance of a market under either competition law or industry-specific regulation by competition metrics alone. Whilst the degree of competitiveness measured by market shares or the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), and the Likelihood of Entry (LET) and Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) tests commonly used to assess market performance 9 provide information about market structure, they do not take account of the actual behaviour of the market participants in response to the wide range of legal, regulatory and commercial obligations under which they interact. Neither do these criteria take account of underlying economic characteristics of the markets concerned that render the pursuit of less concentrated markets alone a poor proxy for the pursuit of either increased welfare or a realistic competitive process (Alleman & Rappoport, 2005) . For example, in markets characterised by high fixed and sunk costs, more intense price competition has been shown to result in a smaller number of firms at equilibrium 9 For example, in as prevails in New Zealand's Mergers and Acquisitions process -see http://www.comcom.govt.nz/Publications/ContentFiles/Documents/MergersandAcquisitionsGuidelines.PDF than either less intense competition or perfect collusion (Ford, Koutsky & Spiwak, 2007:349-50 ).
Prices Best Capture (Static) Consumer Welfare
Rather, in order to derive a reliable view of the efficiency-related outcomes of the ensuing market interactions, the information about market structure derived from market shares, HHI,
LET and SSNIP calculations must be assessed alongside other information that captures behavioural characteristics arising from responses to the incentives offered by the sector's specific contractual and institutional design. For example, in competition law regimes, the risks and penalties arising from likely prosecution for exertion of a dominant position may induce a dominant firm to charge prices close to the competitive level, even though it faces little actual competition. Furthermore, fringe competitors can impose disciplines upon prices charged by dominant firms (Carlton & Perloff, 2005: 110-119) which may not be accurately reflected in structural assessments alone, and where the gains accrued may be achieved more cost-effectively than from ex ante regulatory provisions requiring extensive and costly monitoring and enforcement. Therefore, regardless of any assessment of the presence of market power, prices in a market arguably offer a superior assessment of actual market performance. Specifically, they directly reflect the welfare of consumers arising from actual sector interactions and therefore provide a more accurate barometer of welfare gains than market concentration measures (Hausman & Sidak, 2007) .
Comparative performance can be assessed using benchmarked prices between markets or in one market across time. Furthermore, benchmarked comparisons of actual market performance are more realistic than comparisons of a single market benchmarked against a selected theoretical ideal (e.g. 'perfectly competitive' TELRIC or TSLRIC prices) which is rarely if ever evidenced in practice. For example, Hausman and Sidak (2007) use benchmarked prices in one market in one country deemed competitive on the basis of structural parameters to illustrate that lower prices in the same market in another country that had been adjudged not sufficiently competitive on the basis of the same structural parameters was performing more efficiently and therefore better serving the long-term interests of its consumers than the supposedly more competitive market. Individual prices can be used for comparing individual markets, whilst price indices can be used to compare sector-wide performance over a much larger basket of products and services. The proportional changes recorded using indices also enable direct and relevant comparisons to be made between markets of very different size.
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In telecommunications markets, the number of connections has been widely used as a proxy measure of consumer welfare, as it is presumed that as prices decrease, the number of connections, and therefore consumer welfare, increases. In a mature market constrained by exertion of market power, prices will be higher than efficient and the number of connections will be lower than efficient. In such circumstances, connection numbers in have been used to proxy consumer welfare changes in regulated markets, simply because changes in connection numbers are easier to capture and compare as a measure of change in consumer welfare actually derived than more volatile pricing data (Melody, 2005) . However, in markets for emerging products, connection numbers are a less reliable proxy for consumer welfare conferred, as many factors other than price or exertion of market power may affect the rate of purchase (e.g. wealth effects, availability of applications, information asymmetries, varying customer valuations . For the purposes of this paper, connection numbers will not be used as a primary measure of performance, except where they either confirm or defy price-based analyses or suggest that other anomalies in market performance may exist.
As with the number of connections, levels of usage (e.g. voice minutes, megabytes downloaded) are also typically a function of price, with low prices leading to higher usage and thus the accrual of higher levels of consumer welfare. Normally, changes in usage prices are sufficient to imply changes in consumer welfare. However, measuring usage levels becomes important in capturing consumer welfare when that usage is effectively unpriced (e.g. in the case of 'flat rate' tariffs, where usage is subsidised from connection charges, and heavy users are effectively subsidised by light users). For the purposes of this paper, given the obligations upon the main provider to supply 'flat rate' local voice telephony services and the common use of flat rate pricing for internet connections, usage will be used to further assist in the assessment of consumer welfare accrued.
Revenues, Producer Surplus, and Price Benchmarking
Producer surplus is typically measured as revenue less the costs of production and the opportunity cost capital. A producer with market power charging prices in excess of the costs of production and capital will thus accrue higher revenues for a given volume of output than one with equivalent costs charging the 'efficient' cost-based price. Thus, just as with price benchmarking, revenue benchmarking against a presumed 'competitive' revenue level can be used to assess the likely extent of prices being charged in excess of cost. If observed revenues are higher than the benchmark revenues, then higher profits are being made in the observed market than in the benchmark one -producer surplus is higher.
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However, producer surplus has to be considered in conjunction with the level of consumer surplus (assessed from prices and/or quantities) to make an assessment of overall welfare levels. If both revenues and prices are higher than the benchmark levels, then there is a transfer of welfare from consumers to producers, and it is likely the observed market is operating less efficiently (i.e. at lower levels of consumption) than the benchmarked one.
Higher prices and lower revenues are consistent with lower levels of consumer welfare due to low usage as would be indicated by high prices alone. By contrast, lower prices and higher revenues suggest lower-cost production and higher utilisation, but not any apparently greater exertion of market power. Simply, consumer welfare is higher due to higher usage at the lower prices. Lower prices and lower revenues may occur if there are more extensive supply constraints, which can be cross-checked against utilisation evidence. If utilisation is higher, then lower prices and lower revenues might indicate a market where welfare accrued is allocated predominantly to consumers rather than producers (for example, where price controls or other regulation limits the extent to which producers can share in the market proceeds).
Dynamic Efficiency: Investment Levels, Timing and Entry Patterns
Revenues, retail prices, the number of connections and usage provide an assessment only of the static component of efficiency. They do not take account of dynamic efficiency -the gains that come from product and process innovation. Whilst dynamic efficiency is notoriously difficult to measure, a range of factors can be used to assess performance in this dimension.
The level and timing of investment in both existing and new infrastructures are key measures.
In principle, if the correct incentives are in place, new and/or cheaper technologies will be introduced in a timely manner, leading to increases in welfare from both increased consumer surplus from more highly-valued or lower-priced products, and increased producer surplus from either reduced costs or new profit-making opportunities (Hausman & Sidak, 2005:183) .
New technologies, however, require investments to be made, which will be captured in records of investment levels. Where absence of competition reduces the need for a firm to invest in new technologies, then new, consumer welfare-enhancing investments can be deferred, especially if there are hard-to-assess risks associated with the investment. Total investments are likely therefore to be less than in the competitive case, and the time at which new technologies are made available to consumers will be delayed (Guthrie, 2006 Once again, benchmarking against a comparator across the extent of the possible consumer market enables relative performance assessments to be made.
High levels of market concentration are associated with lower levels of dynamic efficiency due to presumed reduction in rivalry between the firms concerned. However, absence of actual competition on its own is insufficient for a finding of low levels of dynamic efficiency gains without examining the wider regulatory environment. If entry barriers are low, then the simple threat of entry may be sufficient to induce earlier commitment and higher levels of investment than if such entry was not likely (e.g. if restricted by the need to first acquire a licence).
Transaction Costs and Regime Efficiency
Whilst static and dynamic efficiency measures captured in prices, revenues, connection, usage, investment levels and investment timing measure sector performance at the operational level, overall sector efficiency must take into account the total costs creating, monitoring and enforcing the legal and institutional framework in which the sector operates. This includes the court processes for competition law-governed regimes, and the operation of the regulatory bodies under industry-specific regulation (Evans & Quigley, 2000) . The costs may be both tangible, in respect of the costs actually expended, which affect static efficiency, and intangible in respect of prospective gains foregone, a dynamic efficiency measure. For example, some regulatory obligations such as local loop unbundling have been implicated in delays in investing in new technologies, with consequent reductions in the ability of consumers to accrue the gains from using superior technologies (Hausman & Sidak, 2005 ).
Selecting the Benchmarks for Assessing New Zealand's Performance
A comprehensive comparative assessment of the performance of New Zealand's regimes must therefore be based upon a comprehensive set of measures of static and dynamic efficiency, covering the prices, revenues, connection rates, usage levels, investment levels, investment timing and institutional governance costs. Whilst clearly, the relative performance of the industry-specific regulatory regime can be benchmarked to that of the competition lawgoverned regime, it is possible to benchmark both against the same metrics from other regimes.
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For the purposes of this paper, given the interest that New Zealand's competition lawgoverned regime has engendered as the first in the world to eschew industry-specific regulation, its performance will be benchmarked against performance metrics over the same period of other selected OECD countries and the OECD average. Whilst it is recognised that the OECD average is an amalgamation of many different regimes, the common factor linking all other countries is that their telecommunications markets were governed primarily by industry-specific regulation.
If on balance over all of the chosen metrics the New Zealand competition law-based regime can be shown to be operating less efficiently than the average OECD country over the period 
The Competition Law-Governed Period 1987-2001
New Zealand's 'light-handed' telecommunications regime based upon the Commerce Act 1986, precluding the exertion of a dominant position (Section 36), and the Telecommunications Act 1987, was predicated upon a government policy of pursuing economic efficiency (in all of its productive, allocative and dynamic dimensions) and "achieving, wherever possible, a competitive environment in which markets can operate relatively free from subsequent government involvement" (Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson & Teece, 1996 :1863 . Industry-specific regulation was eschewed in part due to its high fixed costs in relation to the very small size of the New Zealand market (only 4 million citizens) and the view that "across the world, this style of regulation has proven itself to be inflexible, 10 It is noted that the 2000 Inquiry that recommended the introduction of industry-specific regulation took as its performance benchmark for the sector that of perfect static efficiency. As the prices charged by the incumbent were deemed not to be perfectly competitive prices, intervention was recommended. However, in respect of dynamic efficiency, regulation of newer services (e.g. ADSL) were nor recommended to be subject to regulation (Howell, 2007 (Howell, 2007; Wilson, 1994) , and ensured that New Zealand's 'free local calling' zones, amongst the most extensive in the OECD (NZIER, 2005) , remained intact in the privatised, deregulated environment.
11 It is one of the very few countries where no licence is required to operate (Lim & Chen, 2008) (Karel, 2003) .
Despite the extent of competitive entry of alternative service and infrastructure providers in the fixed line market (Howell & Obren (2003) , entered the market using the then New Zealand Railways fixed fibre-optic cable to bypass the Telecom network. Clear invested in the provision of local infrastructures servicing the business districts in most New Zealand cities, as well as the domestic and international long-distance markets (Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson and Teece, 1996 
Prices and Static Efficiency in the Fixed Line Market
Despite the apparent lack of competition in the fixed line market, the New Zealand residential Whilst clearly competition in long-distance calling was a significant factor in these prices falling, it is notable that fixed line rentals also fell in real terms, despite the very small amount of actual competition in the market nationwide in the fixed line rental market.
Larger Relative Consumer Welfare Gains from PSTN Price Falls
In practice, apart from small changes in 1992 and adjustments in the few areas where as occurred in most of the rest of the OECD over this period when the advent of competition led to the requirement in most other OECD countries that providers 'unbundle' (or 'rebalance') connection and calling charges, thereby removing the cross-subsidy from calling (both local and long-distance) to connections that had been implemented in part to increase the number of connections sold to price-sensitive residential consumers (Laffont & Tirole, 2002) . Despite the dominant position of the incumbent provider, threat of legal action over abuse of that dominance combined with the price cap obligation of the Kiwi Share and its associated political connotations appear to have resulted in a greater proportionate welfare gain for New Zealanders than delivered under industry-specific regulatory regimes in the rest of the OECD. The advent of the internet as a significant commercial force had significant ramifications for the New Zealand fixed line telephony market, due to the 'free local calling' obligation and the initial use of dial-up modems as the predominant method of internet connection. Figure 3 shows the growth of internet traffic in New Zealand relative to other calling volumes. As the telephony component of internet calling was not charged, New Zealand dial-up internet use was extremely prolific compared to those countries where local call charging prevailed (OECD, 2000) . New Zealand internet service providers (ISPs) were amongst the first to offer flat-rate charges for their services (Enright, 2000) , leading to New Zealand rapidly becoming one of the most highly-connected and highest-using internet consumer markets in the OECD. 
Enhanced Gains

Revenues Confirm Consumer Welfare Gains from Increased Usage
The effect of 'free local calling' on Telecom revenues is evidenced in Figure 5 Revenue figures thus confirm the presumption that not only did New Zealand exhibit much higher levels of internet use than the average OECD country over the 1990s, but that the gains from this additional use were appropriated almost totally by consumers. Producer gains from this increased use were non-existent.. The gain by New Zealand consumers relative to other OECD countries from the advent of the internet was therefore very much larger due to the charging arrangements prevailing. The combined arrangements of both competition law governance, and the specific provisions of New Zealand's 'light-handed' regulatory regimethe 'price cap' and 'free local calling' obligations of the 'Kiwi Share' -thus appear to have delivered superior static efficiency gains in the form of increased consumer welfare than the 'average' OECD industry-specific regulatory arrangements.
Dynamic Efficiency: Investment and New Technologies
Despite the substantial static efficiency gains accrued, it might have been expected that geographic and technological constraints this is unlikely to be exceeded). Moreover, the base level product installed was a fast 2Mbps service, with 128kbps and 256kbps products being installed only when firstly consumer preferences and secondly government purchasing requirements for subsidised rural connection programmes demanded them (Howell, 2003) .
Whilst it might also have been expected that the monopoly provider would have levied high prices for the new (monopoly) service, the evidence confirms that this did not occur either.
OECD ( new technologies. The potential for dynamic efficiency gains appears to be on average greater in New Zealand than in the average OECD country. The apparently perplexing New
Zealand enigma is why the demand side of the market, already one of the most extensively using dial-up internet countries, has failed to rapidly convert that extensive usage to broadband 18 .
'Kiwi Share' and Investment Incentives
Whilst New Zealand's liberal entry provisions led to investment by multiple providers in multiple competing technologies (Ethernet LAN in 1995 , satellite in 1998 , cable in 1999 , wireless in 2002 and mobile broadband in 2005 -Howell, 2007 , each (except for satellite, which was available nationwide) offered only fringe competition to Telecom. Yet due to New Zealand's long history of universal service pricing, fringe competition has had a significant effect on prices in the market. Whilst there was no 'Kiwi Share' obligation to do so, Telecom offered ADSL services nationwide at the identical tariffs, independent of the different costs or differing extent of local competition. Whilst satellite was the early price leader, the prices for all of the technologies (when accounting for speed and other differentiating factors) have converged to very similar levels nationwide, irrespective of the provider identity or actual market presence (Howell, 2003) .
The early introduction, low pricing and wide availability of ADSL are also due in large part to Telecom's 'Kiwi Share' obligations. The interconnection agreement agreed in 1996 between
Telecom and Clear, which became the prototype for all other network contracts, saw the network owner whose customer originated a call paying a termination charge to the operator on whose network the call terminated. With the emergence of the internet, as a consequence of 'free local calling', PSTN call minutes grew exponentially (Figure 3 ), creating an arbitrage opportunity for network operators who could sign up a disproportionate number of the ISPs as customers.
Strategic Responses to Competitor Actions
Telecom's competitors seized upon the arbitrage opportunity. Karel (2003) Despite these inducements, initial ADSL uptake was sluggish, leading Telecom in September 1999 to impose a retail charge of 2c per minute (the termination charge) for internet calls made to non Telecom-affiliated ISPs for all calls made after ten free hours a month had been consumed (which still constituted an interconnect liability to Telecom of $12 per month for every consumer calling a non-Telecom ISP -setting a bound on the notional loss that 19 In part due to the fact that over 95% of New Zealand internet traffic comes from overseas over the monopoly Southern Cross Cable, which due to peering agreements sees New Zealand internet users paying all of the costs of both uploaded and downloaded traffic across this trans-Pacific cable.
Telecom could incur on an ADSL connection and still be in no worse a position than under the status quo). This action, which became known as the '0867' case after the calling prefix 
Transaction Costs
Whilst there were clearly superior gains for New Zealand consumers at the expense of Telecom over the 1990s as a consequence of the interaction of the competition law regime and the 'Kiwi Share' provisions, and with few apparent impediments to investments in new technologies, the question of the systemic transaction costs incurred in order to appropriate these gains must be considered. Only two cases alleging a breach of Telecom's dominant position were brought during the 1990s, and in neither case was it found that Telecom had transgressed. Nonetheless, criticisms were made about the process of bringing a case under Section 36. These centred around the time taken to resolve a court case, and the costs of such actions.
Costs of Court Cases
The 'Clear' case took three years and hearings in three courts (High Court, Court of Appeal and the Privy Council) to be resolved. The '0867' case brought in 1999, was finally adjudicated in 2008 -a span of nine years. Both involved substantial costs, in terms of expert evidence and the provision (in many cases the recreation) of key information regarding the actions undertaken by the various parties. Nonetheless, these costs constitute the sole out-ofpocket expenses incurred under the competition law-governed regime.
It is somewhat harder to quantify what opportunity costs might have been foregone as a consequence of the competition law regime. Whilst plausibly the absence of a regulatory regime requiring detailed reporting of prices, costs and other data may have made it harder for firms to adjudge the likelihood of Telecom's prices being anti-competitive when making the decision about whether to take a Section 36 case (Blanchard, 1994a; 1994b) , ex post analysis of the form above suggests that the small number of cases observed may have been because few breaches were actually incurred. Moreover, if the court-based system is working efficiently, cases should only be brought if the likely gains (weighted by the probability of the result being favourable) exceed the costs of doing so.
Court Processes and Dynamic Efficiency Gains from Entry
It has also been suggested that firms may have delayed entering the market whilst awaiting the result of the court actions brought by another firm (MoC/Treasury, 1995). However, to bring a case, a contract must actually have struck (or in the case of '0867', a different product mix must be brought to market). Clear could still transact with customers on the basis of the initial interconnection agreement, even whilst it was under dispute. Some gains in welfare could therefore potentially accrue to consumers from product differentiation, albeit not as many as if all potential efficiency-raising entry occurred at the outset. Likewise, losses in welfare were averted by Telecom being able to proceed with the '0867' charges whilst the case was being resolved.
By contrast, under a regulated system, regulated services are typically not offered until the regulator and all firms concerned have agreed terms, precluding any potential offering of services to consumers and consequently delaying the accrual of consumer welfare as well.
Thus it is not clear that there were necessarily lost opportunities as a consequence of the court processes that are not also attendant to the regulatory regime. Regulation would be superior only if it was demonstrably faster at resolving disputes than the court process or resulted in a more efficient outcome. Given the extent of welfare gains accrued in the New Zealand case relative to other OECD countries, it is difficult to see how ex ante regulation could have delivered a clearly better static or dynamic efficiency performance in the internet market than exhibited herein.
Concerns were also expressed that the inability of a small entrant to underwrite a lengthy court action might induce Telecom to charge higher prices, thereby limiting the gains achievable from increased competition. If the only option available was action brought by another firm, then this argument might be plausible. However, the Commerce Act provisions allowed the Commerce Commission as the ultimate custodian of the public interest to bring a case if it was deemed necessary due to the degree of fragmentation of the potential claimants (as occurred with '0867'). Again, it is difficult to draw conclusions apart from the observation that in the '0867' case small firms (ISPs) through lobbying the Commission achieved the result of a prosecution without having to incur the full costs themselves. Such
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free-riding might actually result in inefficiently too much being spent on lobbying and litigation in respect of cases ultimately found not to be exertions of dominance.
Courts, Regulation and Efficiency
Also to be considered is the observation from Blanchard (1995) and expanded by Carlton & Picker (2007) and Howell (2007; is that in the pursuit of efficiency, court-based processes are hampered by the fact that courts are restricted to addressing the matters brought before them. Litigated cases may not be the most important in respect of ensuring the pursuit of efficiency. Furthermore, dependent upon the economic knowledge of the judges or the body of jurisprudence used to decide a matter, an action adjudged to be competitive may actually result in a reduction in efficiency. For example, the acceptance of ECPR in the Clear case imposes a pricing precedent which is not always the most efficient in all circumstances (Economides & White, 1995) . Whilst this statement is true, it is also by no means certain that decisions made by regulators are any better in respect to promoting increased efficiency -for example, when short-run pursuit of competition is prioritised over long-run pursuit of dynamic efficiency (Howell, 2008a) .
Summary
In conclusion, therefore, the evidence indicates that on balance, the New Zealand telecommunications sector under the light-handed regulatory regime combining predominantly competition law and contractual constraints performed more efficiently than the average OECD country in respect of both static and dynamic efficiency gains, whilst the net gains and losses from the transaction costs of the institutional regime are somewhat equivocal.
Industry-Specific Regulation: 2002-2007
Following the 1999 general election, in 2000 the incoming coalition government instigated a Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunications 20 . Despite undertaking an analysis of prices and uptake of services, and finding New Zealand's performance not dissimilar to other OECD countries, the Inquiry recommended the replacement of the competition law-governed regime with an industry-specific regulator with the power to set prices for a range of PSTN-related services (termed 'designated' services). The justification given was that cost benefit analyses indicated Telecom was still charging prices in excess of cost, thereby necessitating regulatory 20 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/StandardSummary____16318.aspx intervention and the imposition of TSLRIC-based prices (i.e. the industry should be regulated because it was not performing according to the benchmark of theoretical perfect competition, rather than because it was performing demonstrably less well than regimes operating under the type of industry-specific regulation proposed).
Importantly, however, the inquiry exempted data services from becoming designated, requiring instead that they be wholesaled by Telecom to competitors at regulated 'retail minus' prices. Local loop unbundling (LLU) was also rejected on the basis that substantial investment in facilities-based competition had already occurred, but with the proviso that a further inquiry be undertaken into its feasibility before the end of 2003 (Section 64). These recommendations were accepted and given legal force in the Telecommunications Act 2001.
Importantly, the Act contained a section 19(2) requiring that the Commissioner take account of economic efficiency when making his determinations and recommendations, but granted the Minister the power to reject recommendations made by the Commissioner in respect of additional services to be regulated (Howell, 2008b) .
The further recommendation that Telecom alone should bear the cost of the 'Kiwi Share'
social obligations until such time as it could justify to the Minister that its losses necessitated adjustments to its capped retail prices was rejected and replaced in the Act with the Telecommunications Service Order (TSO). Under the TSO, the costs to Telecom of maintaining unprofitable 'Kiwi Share' services would be assessed annually by the regulator and shared across all providers in the industry whose trading activities affected Telecom's ability to subsidise the loss-causing customers. The TSO arrangement finally resolved that the entire industry, and not Telecom shareholders alone, bore responsibility for the costs of social obligations, via a mechanism that enabled their costs to be transparently separated from the prices charged by Telecom to its competitor-customers.
The arrangements finally enacted consisted of many political compromises. Industry-specific regulation replaced competition law as the main institutional governance arrangement. Initial hopes were that the new arrangements would address the principal perceived shortcomings of the previous institutions -namely the long time taken to get court decisions and the uncertainty this created, and the degree of contention surrounding interconnection agreements -whilst retaining the benefits of the 'light-handed' approach that had led to the consumer gains accrued across the 1990s. Indeed, the Inquiry report presaged that its recommendations "would still see New Zealand at very much the light-handed end of the spectrum, arguably the lightest in the OECD" (p 30). The workload anticipated for the proposed regulatory authority was presumed to require an annual budget of $1.5 million and eight to ten staff (p 28).
Transaction Costs, Institutional Incentives and Dynamic Efficiency
The Telecommunications Commission was established within the Commerce Commission, and the first Commissioner began duties in March 2002 21 . The decision-making process replicated the previous court arrangements, with bilateral agreements between Telecom and its rivals to be mediated by the Commission only if the parties could not come to a satisfactory agreement themselves. Draft determinations, followed by conferences and final decisions once all views had been sought, replicated the court processes of hearing and appeal, but the Commissioner was given wider scope to consider issues not specifically brought by industry participants.
Few Incentives to Negotiate
In practice, however, the structure of the Commission processes and the provisions of the Act removed all incentives for market participants to strike contracts outside of the regulatory process. As the costs of the Commission were funded by a market share-based levy on all participants, small participants could seek their own determinations rather than relying upon the precedents set by the larger firms (as occurred following the 1991-94 Clear case) -in effect, free-riding on the larger contributions towards the costs of the processes made by the larger participants. Furthermore, the Act precluded any party striking a product access agreement with Telecom outside of the regulatory process from subsequently petitioning the regulator for a determination in respect of that product. Specifically, if another party later was granted regulated access to the same product at more favourable terms, the first firm could not seek a regulatory intervention to gain access on the same terms as the regulated agreement.
The consequence was virtually every agreement between Telecom and its rivals was brought irrespective of the quality of the decisions made.
The TSO and Dynamic Efficiency Consequences
The longer times taken to make decisions reduced dynamic efficiency gains in the market An especial concern attends the delays incurred in settling the TSO levies. The TSO is essentially a 'tax' on entrants to compensate Telecom for revenues foregone in those areas where by dint of the prices Telecom was charging above cost to subsidise rural consumers competitive entry was disproportionately concentrated due to the distortion in retail prices. In theory, the tax would overcome the problem of more entry than efficient occurring in highly competitive areas by passing on the costs of social services to entrants. In effect, Telecom had already been doing this pre-2001, by using ECPR to set interconnection prices. However, under regulated TSLRIC prices, where the costs could not be included in Telecom's prices to competitors, the compensation had to be recovered via alternative mechanisms.
Whilst the TSO process made the cost to each entrant explicit and transparent, the time taken to reach a determination added substantial additional uncertainty to entry and pricing decisions. As the TSO levy was determined in arrears -up to three years after the trading activity had occurred -it became impossible to make reasonable entry and pricing decisions with any realistic confidence. Each party had to assess not just the effect of its own strategies upon the market, but also those of all its competitors to forecast likely the future tax liability.
The more participants in the market, the harder the tax forecasting task became. Even small errors in assumptions could have significant ramifications upon break-even and entry decisions -a significant barrier for small new entrants who lacked reserves to bear the risks of possible underestimations, the extent of which would be discovered only when the tax was finally levied. Entry was therefore substantially discouraged, relative to the case where Telecom's ECPR price indicated prior to the entry or pricing decision what the extent of the liability would be.
It is also noted that retention of universal service pricing via the TSO perpetuated the perversion of investment incentives in rural areas. Whereas it is likely that alternative technologies (e.g. wireless and mobile) offered lower-cost solutions in many rural areas, Telecom's obligation to subsidise rural connections both made it uneconomic for more efficient alternative investments to occur whilst simultaneously requiring capital expenditure to be outlaid in maintaining and upgrading a likely less efficient network.
Effect of Industry-Specific Regulation on Market Structure
Hence, it is unsurprising that, unlike the 1990s, no new entry occurred in the fixed line sector 
Static Efficiency Performance
The impression of the intensely vibrant, competitive interaction during the 1990s, with substantial welfare gains being accrued by consumers as market participants sought to strategically out-manoeuvre each other on the basis of contracts and commercial engagement coming to a grinding halt in the 2000s under industry-specific regulation is borne out by the New Zealand residential price index in Figure 6 , and the Telecommunications Consumer Price Index in Figure 7 .
Regulated Rates and Price Indices
Following the extensive gains made in the 1990s (Figure 1 locations. There has clearly been an increase in consumer welfare from increased uptake of the new and faster technologies. However, given the extent to which New Zealand broadband uptake lags international comparators, the apparently lower welfare gains in this market despite lower prices requires further analysis. Aside from the more generally-accepted factors depressing New Zealand's uptake (low GDP per capita, low population density, low urbanisation -de Ridder, 2007; Wallsten, 2006) , the institutional regulatory governance arrangements and ensuing strategic interactions between market participants, the regulator and government also offer some credible explanations.
Bitstream Unbundling, Broadband Uptake and Market Structure
Bitstream unbundling was mandated in December 2003, but not introduced until September 2004. Figure 8 shows that over the first three quarters of 2004, whilst the growth rate of ADSL connections was accelerating, the market share Telecom's competitors fell from over 35% to less than 24%. It cannot be discounted that in anticipation of the bitstream products becoming available, competitors had few incentives to sell the existing wholesale products despite their affiliated ISPs commanding around 50% of the now-mature dial-up internet market ( Figure 4 ). That is, mandating bitstream access regulation resulted in a temporary reduction in competition given the time required to introduce a new regulated service. The data are consistent with the 'regulatory delay' theory postulated in section 3.1 above.
However, Figure 8 reveals that, even after bitstream services were made available, the market share sold by competitors hovered consistently around 25% for over a year in a rapidly growing market where the competitors already had a commercial relationship with at least half of the most likely purchasers -the dial-up ISP customers. A likely explanation is that given Telecom's already low prices and the extensive range of two-part tariffs offered, there was no margin available in the bitstream product market upon which competitors could arbitrage. Howell (2003) shows that at the time, even New Zealand broadband consumers buying connections with high data caps (10Gb/month) typically consumed only low volumes of data (average 1.5Gb/month; median 800kb/month). Consumers could pick the most appropriate access and data bundle in order to minimise monthly cash outlay, meaning entry level packages with low data caps were the most popular for substituting dial-up users. When the Commission calculated TSLRIC-benchmarked cost-based prices for the bitstream services they indicated monthly prices higher than the entry level retail prices charged by Telecom since 1999 (Covec, 2004) . The Commissioner reverted to retail-minus pricing for this service, but even so, the regulated wholesale price of $27.76 ultimately decided 30 compared to the entry level Telecom retail price of only $29.95 per month.
Strategic Responses to Regulatory Incentives
Whilst Telecom's competitors predictably claimed Telecom's prices to be evidence of overt predatory pricing behaviour designed to foreclose competition, the fact that these prices had prevailed for over 5 years without any anti-trust cases being brought and were matched over this period by other providers of broadband on other technologies makes this claim difficult to substantiate. However, the competitive response not to vigorously pursue the burgeoning broadband market at this time was predictable on two counts. 
Demand-Side Responses Reflected in Usage and Revenue Data
Until new applications unable to operate successfully on dial-up came into widespread use, for low volume users (the majority of New Zealanders) free dial-up access offered better net value (welfare) than broadband that had to be paid for 2008b Zealand has exhibited one of the fastest broadband connection growth rates per capita in the OECD (Howell, 2008b) . This has also been when worldwide growth in use of peer-to-peer sites such as YouTube, Bebo, Facebook and Skype has become significant. New Zealanders' substitution to broadband has simply occurred later than in other countries where the telephony component of dial-up internet access was charged, as the marginal valuation of internet use at which substitution will occur is lower the greater the extent to which dial-up usage is subsidised from connection charging .
The cumulative effect of the growth of broadband connections is reflected in the comparative revenue index in Figure 9 . Whilst OECD revenues grew steadily compared to 1997 levels over the period 1997 to 2005, New Zealand revenues did not exceed 1997 levels until 2002, at which point, consistent with the growth in broadband accounts, revenues began growing.
Whereas in the average OECD country, consumers paid for use of the internet incrementally as their usage grew, in New Zealand it was only once the welfare derived by consumers from broadband use overcame the hurdle imposed by the gifting of free use of dial-up internet have producer revenues been able to 'catch up', with the extent of consumer welfare accrued. It is noted that the area under both the revenue curves in Figure 9 is approximately the same. The difference is that accrual of benefits by producers has been effectively delayed in the New Zealand case by the effect of the 'Kiwi Share' skewing the initial allocation of the welfare benefits of internet use disproportionately towards consumers.
Further Efficiency Consequences: LLU and Separation
Despite an absence of evidence via prices or availability of poor efficiency-related broadband market performance that could not be plausibly explained as consequences of regulatory 
Dynamic Efficiency and Investment Incentives
The literature on the effects of LLU on sector investment suggests that the policy may either stimulate investment by new entrants via the 'Ladder of Investment' or chill investment incentives for the incumbent (Hausman & Sidak, 2005) . 
Investment and Revenues
For any investment to proceed, firms must be able to receive a fair return on that investment to compensate for both capital use and risk. Stocktake (MED, 2006 found that
Telecom's overall investment levels were less than in other comparator countries on a per capita basis and on the basis of investment as a percentage of revenue. Whilst Figure 10 appears to confirm that New Zealand's investment as a share of revenue fell substantially from 2002, separate analysis of revenues and investment in Figure 9 indicates that in the post- Consequently, the inefficient over-investment and extensive stranding of assets occurring in many other OECD markets following the crash were not significant features of the New Zealand market. not because of the motive of foreclosing competition but because these are the ones where it is economically most rational to invest as the potential returns are higher. Interestingly, the most prolific investor in Telecom's unbundled exchanges (and the owner of the largest stock of likely stranded assets) is the government-owned Kordia-Orcon.
Investment Compromises, Higher Costs and Stranded Assets
The Scale of New Zealand and the Impact of Regulatory Overheads
In addition to the dynamic incentive effects, further transaction costs have been imposed on the industry as a consequence of proceeding with LLU and separation. Both are very costly processes, and must be considered in proportion to the small scale of the New Zealand market and the likely extent of any additional benefits, given prices are already low and ADSL speeds high by OECD standards. Functional separation was estimated by Telecom to impose a fixed cost of NZ$300 million on the firm -not dissimilar to the £70 million estimated fixed cost to BT of creating Openreach (converted using purchasing power parity exchange rates).
The effect of scale suggests that the per capita or per account costs of separation will be very much larger in New Zealand than in Britain, indicating a much higher benefit threshold must be passed to justify the adoption of separation in New Zealand. On the basis of household size, the costs per household of the fixed costs alone are 16 to 17 times higher in New
Zealand than in Britain. Had a comparative cost-benefit analysis been undertaken, the benefits of separation would have needed to be 16 to 17 times greater per household than those in Britain to justify proceeding.
Benchmarking the costs of separation against the costs of a broadband account suggests that it is highly unlikely that the fixed costs of separation are likely to be recouped in further It is difficult to see where benefits of the extent indicated will be generated as a consequence of the regulatory instrument chosen being implemented. Inevitably, Telecom's prices must rise if these costs are to be recovered and the firm is to remain financially viable.
Summary
In sum, therefore, it would appear that the industry-specific regulatory regime from 2002 to 2007 has failed to generate efficiency gains comparable to the regime that preceded it. As a consequence of the incentives created and substantial underestimation of their effects, the institutional arrangements imposed are more bureaucratic and cumbersome, and hence more costly in both out-of-pocket expenses and potential dynamic efficiency losses than the arrangements that proceeded them. Neither is it clear that they have succeeded in making the market more competitive. Indeed, the reverse appears to have occurred, with strategic gaming of political and regulatory processes appearing to replace strategic competitive commercial interaction in shaping the direction of the industry. Whilst investment is occurring, it is more costly than previously was the case as a consequence of the additional overheads incurred.
Lessons from New Zealand
Returning to the questions posed in Section 1, on balance over the efficiency metrics chosen for analysis, it can be concluded that the competition law-based regime prevailing in New regime. Consequently, it can be concluded that, in the New Zealand case, the industryspecific regulatory regime has failed to improve on overall sector efficiency performance relative to the regime it replaced. The failure has led to further changes increasing the degree of regulatory restraint, which are unlikely to result in further improvements.
However, it is too simplistic to take the analysis as 'proof' that competition law offers a superior governance method. The New Zealand example illustrates that the contracts and agreements that shape the interaction between participants, whether they be commercially- Unfortunately, it was all too easy for the New Zealand politicians, public, regulators and market participants pre-2001 to jump to the flawed conclusion that it was the differences in overarching industry governance arrangements and institutions that were 'causing' the observable differences. The flaws in reasoning that led to increasingly more stringent industry-specific regulation were driven in part by over-reliance upon structural and institutional measures of competitiveness in assessing sector performance -e.g. market shares and the number of entrants -and insufficient attention being given to efficiency-related measures such as prices and revenues. The focus on institutions and market structure rather than contracts and efficiency further obscured the need to revisit the one part of the regulatory arrangements that was not assigned to the purview of either the courts or the regulator -the 'Kiwi Share'.
The lessons to be taken from the analysis of the New Zealand industry are that in the final analysis, it is the nature of the contracts and participants' responses to them that matter most for sector performance. Optimal institutional arrangements will differ depending upon underlying economic circumstances and the nature of contractual interaction that ensues.
Competition law and industry-specific regulation are complements which can in conjunction lead to increased efficiency, as shown under the joint governance of competition law and the 'Kiwi Share' in the 1990s. They do not have to be seen only as substitutes (Crandall & Picker, 2007) . The removal of the purview of a regulator from the day-to-day governance of the sector does not mean the end of regulatory control, if contractual undertakings and legislated obligations can impose comparable disciplines that further the pursuit of economic efficiency. In the final analysis, the balance must be determined by trading off the different forms of efficiency consequences of each set of circumstances as they are faced. There is no 'one size' of regulation, institution, competition or market structure that 'fits all'. Each case must be measured and assessed on its efficiency-based merits and underlying economic circumstances. Pursuit of efficiency, not pursuit of competition, must be the goal. 
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